

IN RE: Porter & Mary Freeman)
 Dist. 17, Map 33, Control Map 33, Parcel 109.00) Williamson County
 Residential Property)
 Tax Year 2006)

Statement of the Case

LAND VALUE	IMPROVEMENT VALUE	TOTAL VALUE	ASSESSMENT
\$12,600	\$67,500	\$79,700	\$19,929

This matter was reviewed by the undersigned administrative law judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) §§ 67-5-1412, 67-5-1501 and 67-5-1505. This hearing was conducted on November 21, 2006, at the Williamson County Property Assessor's Office; present at the hearing were Mr. and Mrs. Porter Freeman, the taxpayer who represented himself, and Mr. Clifford Anglin and Mr. D. Shane Anglin, both Tennessee Certified Appraisers for Williamson County Property Assessor.

The germane issue in this appeal is the value of the subject property as of January 1, 2006.

The basis of valuation as stated in T.C.A. § 67-5-601(a) is that “[t]he value of all property shall be ascertained from the evidence of its sound, intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer without consideration of speculative values”

After having reviewed all the evidence in this case, the administrative judge finds that the subject property should be valued at \$ 79,700 based upon the presumption of correctness attaching to the decision of the Williamson County Board of Equalization.¹

The administrative judge finds that the taxpayer’s equalization argument must be rejected. The administrative judge finds that the State Board of Equalization has historically adhered to a market value standard when setting values for property tax purposes. See *Appeals of Laurel Hills Apartments, et al.* (Davidson County, Tax Years 1981 and 1982, Final Decision and Order, April 10, 1984). Under this theory, an owner of property is entitled to “equalization” of its demonstrated market value by a ratio which reflects the overall level of appraisal in the jurisdiction for the tax year in controversy.² The State Board has repeatedly refused to accept the *appraised* values of purportedly comparable properties as sufficient proof of the *market* value of a property under appeal. For example, in *Stella L. Swope* (Davidson County, Tax Years 1993 and 1994), the Assessment Appeals Commission rejected such an argument reasoning as follows:

The assessor’s recorded values for other properties may suffer from errors just as Ms. Swope has alleged for her assessment, and therefore the recorded values cannot be assumed to prove market value.
Final Decision and Order at 2.

In yet another case, the administrative judge finds that the April 10, 1984, decision of the State Board of Equalization in *Laurel Hills Apartments* also holds that “as a matter of law property in Tennessee is required to be valued and equalized according to the “Market Value Theory’.” As stated by the Board, the Market Value Theory requires that property “be appraised annually at full market value and **equalized by application of the appropriate appraisal ratio . . .**” *Id.* at 1.(emphasis added)

The Assessment Appeals Commission elaborated upon the concept of equalization in *Franklin D. & Mildred J. Herndon* (Montgomery County, Tax Years 1989 and 1990) (June 24, 1991), when it rejected the taxpayer’s equalization argument reasoning in pertinent part as follows:

¹ Mr. Freeman believes that the value placed on his property by the County Board was influenced by a notation of ‘previous appraisal’ on the form although he could not produce a copy at the hearing. The Exhibit #1 that he did produce shows ‘previous **assessment**’ not appraisal.

² See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-5-1604-1606. Usually, in a year of reappraisal – whose very purpose is to appraise all properties in the taxing jurisdiction at their fair market values – the appraisal ratio is 1.0000 (100%). That is the situation here.

In contending the entire property should be appraised at no more than \$60,000 for 1989 and 1990, the taxpayer is attempting to compare his appraisal with others. There are two flaws in this approach. First, while the taxpayer is certainly entitled to be appraised at no greater percentage of value than other taxpayers in Montgomery County on the basis of equalization, the assessor's proof establishes that this property is not appraised at any higher percentage of value than the level prevailing in Montgomery County for 1989 and 1990. That the taxpayer can find other properties which are more under appraised than average **does not entitle him to similar treatment**. Secondly, as was the case before the administrative judge, the taxpayer has produced an impressive number of "comparables" but has not **adequately indicated how the properties compare to his own in all relevant respects**. . . . (emphasis added) Final Decision and Order at 2.

See also *Earl and Edith LaFollette*, (Sevier County, Tax Years 1989 and 1990) (June 26, 1991), wherein the Commission rejected the taxpayer's equalization argument reasoning that "[t]he evidence of other tax-appraised values might be relevant if it indicated that properties throughout the county were under appraised . . ." Final Decision and Order at 3.

Since the taxpayer is appealing from the determination of the Williamson County Board of Equalization, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. See State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.11(1) and *Big Fork Mining Company v. Tennessee Water Control Board*, 620 S.W. 2d 515 (Tenn.App. 1981).

With respect to the issue of market value, the administrative judge finds that Mr. Freeman simply introduced insufficient evidence to affirmatively establish the **market value** of subject property as of January 1, 2006, the relevant assessment date pursuant to T. C. A. § 67-5-504(a).³

ORDER

It is therefore ORDERED that the following value and assessment be adopted for tax year 2006:

<u>LAND VALUE</u>	<u>IMPROVEMENT VALUE</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>	<u>ASSESSMENT</u>
\$12,200	\$67,500	\$79,700	\$19,929

It is FURTHER ORDERED that any applicable hearing costs be assessed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501(d) and State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.17.

Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-301—325, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501, and the Rules of Contested Case Procedure of the State Board of Equalization, the parties are advised of the following remedies:

³ It is clear from the property record card (page 4 of the County's exhibit) the County has previously given the taxpayer a "50% depreciation for flooding in the last 5 years".


1. A party may appeal this decision and order to the Assessment Appeals Commission pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501 and Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization. Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-1501(c) provides that an appeal **“must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date the initial decision is sent.”** Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization provides that the appeal be filed with the Executive Secretary of the State Board and that the appeal **“identify the allegedly erroneous finding(s) of fact and/or conclusion(s) of law in the initial order”**; or

2. A party may petition for reconsideration of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-317 within fifteen (15) days of the entry of the order. The petition for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking administrative or judicial review; or

3. A party may petition for a stay of effectiveness of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-316 within seven (7) days of the entry of the order.

This order does not become final until an official certificate is issued by the Assessment Appeals Commission. Official certificates are normally issued seventy-five (75) days after the entry of the initial decision and order if no party has appealed.

ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2006.



ANDREI ELLEN LEE
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION

cc: Mr. Porter & Mary Freeman, Taxpayer
Dennis Anglin, Assessor of Property